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Foreword 
Ever since the breakthrough in nuclear physics which led to the application 
of nuclear energy for practical purposes, the close relationship between 
military and civilian uses of this energy has been a problem for the interna-
tional community. But it has also been an incentive for international co-
operation. Efforts in the international arena to halt the spread of nuclear 
weapons to additional countries started at the end of the war, and has 
continued ever since. 
An international non-proliferation regime has gradually been estab-
lished in order to control that civilian nuclear activities are not used as a 
basis for military nuclear development. The lin pinches of the non-prolifera-
tion regime are the safeguards program of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the safeguards regime established to verity the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. The two safeguards programs are somewhat different 
in nature, but both are administered by the IAEA. None of them give 
foolproof guarantee against military diversion, as has been demonstrated by 
developments over the recent years in Iraq and North Korea. 
The establishment of the international non-proliferation regime was 
difficult because it implied a renunciation of national sovereignty to a 
degree unheard of before. This article highlights the kind of compromises 
regarding the functions of!AEA that were made during the negotiations on 
the establishment of the Agency in order to put in place the first safeguards 
program. The core of the deal was sharing of nuclear technology in ex-
change for adherence to the lAEA safeguards regime. This deal has been 
the central element in the strategy of non-proliferation for the last 40 years. 
The weaknesses inherent in this deal are still with us. 
This article was written as part of a larger project entitled «Atomic 
technology control versus liberalism», financed by the Norwegian Re-
search Council. The writing took place during a stay at the United Nations' 
Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva. I wish to thank UNIDlR's 
staff for kind assistance; the Norwegian Royal Ministry ofForeig'l Affairs 
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for giving me access to their files; and Virginia Gamba, Mustafa 
Kibaroglu, and Olav Riste for comments on an earlier draft. 
Geneva, February 1995 
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Introduction 
With his Atoms for peace speech at the United Nations in December 1953 
Eisenhower succeeded in shifting the balance between the fear of the 
military atom and the hope of bountiful use of the peaceful atom in favour 
of the latter. His idea of mobilising experts to apply nuclear energy to the 
needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities, and in particu-
lar to provide «the power-starved areas of the world>> with abundant 
energy, produced much enthusiasm world-wide. 
The atoms for peace strategy came to be seen as a means to help coun-
tries modernise their societies. Many countries both in Europe and in the 
rest of the world looked upon the American society as a role model for 
economic development. Several small European countries, like Norway, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland, and even bigger ones, like Britain and 
France, had long been frustrated because of the American unwillingness to 
cooperate in nuclear energy matters. Such countries were relieved that the 
secrecy surrounding nuclear energy development in the United States was 
finally to be lifted. 
This was, furthermore, a period characterised by decolonisation. This 
meant that the world, to a certain extent, was perceived to be polarised 
between developing and industrialised countries. It was generally agreed 
that the key to solving the economic problems ofthe developing countries 
was for them to go through a modernisation process like the countries in 
the West had done in the 19th century. One aspect of development aid 
strongly favoured at the time was technology transfer from richer to poorer 
countries. Eisenhower's international nuclear materials and information 
<<pooh> could be seen as a specialised equivalent to the World Bank, 
promising to provide developing countries and others with the basic 
ingredients for going ahead with nuclear industrialisation. Such enthusiasm 
for nuclear industrialisation can be seen as a continuation of the scientisrn 
that was so characteristic of European nation-builders in the last century. 
It was this belief in progress as a result of scientific development that 
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created the world-wide enthusiasm for nuclear energy. The enthusiasm was 
particularly strong in the wake of the first open conference on the peaceful 
uses of atomic energy, held in Geneva in the summer of 1955. For the first 
time since the war and the implementation of the McMahon Act, scientists 
from all over the world could publish and discuss freely among themselves. 
For the scientists it was like a return to the good old times. For countries 
embarking on nuclear industrialisation, it was a harbinger of good things to 
come. The hopes that were raised by Eisenhower's atomic bank were so 
strong that they induced the majority of UN members to accept unprec-
edented restrictions on the exercise of national sovereignty in return for 
access to information and materials. 
Eisenhower's personal commitment; USA's unique position as an 
economic super power, and the wide backing that the president's speech 
got, partly explain why countries that at the outset were reluctant to support 
the Atoms for Peace scheme ended by yielding to it. The reluctant coun-
tries included both friends and foes. Accepting the new American initia-
tive, meant, for instance, that British nuclear policy had to be rethought. 
Initially, Foreign Office officials seriously considered not taking part in the 
negotiations even if otl1er countries went along. But they ended not only by 
taking part, but by playing a leading role throughout the negotiations 
together with the Americans and the Canadians. Persuading the Russians 
was a gradual process conducted bilaterally in the form of diplomatic 
despatches between the State Department and the Soviet ambassador to 
Washington. Determination on the American part to go ahead with the 
scheme no matter what the United Kingdom or the Soviet Union would do, 
so long as the scheme was supported by a large majority in the UN General 
Assembly, was probably the decisive factor in persuading the reluctant big 
powers to go along. 
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The negotiation process 
The negotiating process started with the rather vague ideas contained in 
Eisenhower's address before the UN General Assembly on December 8, 
1953. Eisenhower proposed that an International Atomic Energy Agency 
should be established to which the major nuclear powers should make joint 
contributions from their stockpiles of natural uranium and fissile materials. 
The idea behind this proposal was that if «the entire body of the world's 
leading scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable 
material with which to test and develop their ideas, ( ... )this capability 
would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient, and economic 
usage>>.' Eisenhower furthermore indicated that the proposed agency 
should be responsible for the storage and protection, including against 
seizure, of the fissile materials bank.' The president also suggested that the 
ratios of contributions; the procedures; and other details were to be decided 
through «private conversations>> among the nuclear powers.' 
In this way a process was initiated which led to the opening up of 
bilateral and trilateral discussions with the United Kingdom and Canada, 
and a diplomatic correspondence with the Soviet Union. In the course of 
the American-Russian exchanges a first US outline of the Agency was 
presented in March 1954. At the end of the year both an American and a 
British draft for a statute were circulated for discussion. Shortly before, at 
the 9th session of the UN General Assembly, seven countries had spon-
sored a resolution put forward by the Americans.' It was a resolution 
supporting the establishment of the proposed agency and suggesting that a 
technical conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be 
convened in Geneva in August 1955. In April 1955 the seven sponsoring 
countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, South Africa, United 
Kingdom and the United States) plus Portugal (which was not a UN 
member but a big producer of uranium ore) started ad hoc and informal 
discussions in Washington on the basis of a US draft, itself the result of 
several revisions. The discussions of the 8-nation group produced a new 
draft which was handed over to the Soviet Union on 29 July 1955, shortly 
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before the opening of the Geneva Conference. 
During the last week of the Geneva Conference the six most experi-
enced countries in the production of nuclear energy (Canada, Czechoslova-
kia, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States) 
met to discuss safeguards of fissile materials. Although the meeting did not 
bring any concrete results regarding safeguards, it was important in bring-
ing the Soviet Union into formal multilateral discussions. 
At the lOth session of the General Assembly, in 1955, India took the 
lead among developing countries in criticising the representation in the 8-
power group. The group was therefore expanded into the 12-power «Work-
ing Level Meeting>> (hereafter called the 12-power group), with Brazil, 
Czechoslovakia, India and the Soviet Union joining the drafting group. In 
revising the draft, the 12-power group took into consideration written 
comments that had been submitted to the United States by 39 governments. 
The earlier draft was thoroughly overhauled and a number of substantial 
changes were made. At the end, the text was approved ad referendum, but 
each member was free to speak on the draft at the forthcoming Conference 
on the Statute, and several states, including the Soviet Union and India, 
formally reserved their positions in regard to particular parts ofthe text. 
The Conference on the Statute opened at the UN Headquarters in New 
York on 20 September 1956, and concluded its sessions on 26 October 
with a ceremony opening the Statute for signature. Although the Confer-
ence was held in part in response to a General Assembly resolution, and 
although the meetings took place where they did, the Conference all the 
same was convened and sponsored by the 12 governments represented in 
the 12-power group.' 
Since the draft resulting from the discussions within the 12-power 
group represented a rather precarious compromise, care was taken to 
prevent the adoption of difficult amendments at the final conference. 
Procedural devices and a restricted schedule were the most important 
means to reach this aim.' The scheme largely worked, due to the fact that 
the potentially most difficult countries, the Soviet Union (East) and India 
(South), were sponsoring the draft by now and, consequently, to a large 
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extent abstained from proposing amendments at the final conference, even 
in cases where they had strong misgivings. 7 Of the 67 amendments that 
were put down, a majority were insubstantial. The large number of amend-
ments were thus interpreted by one British official as «a gesture of rebel-
lion against the pressure of the 12 Powers to discourage any tampering 
with the draft»." 
To sum up: the successful outcome of the Eisenhower proposal to 
establish an International Atomic Energy Agency was dependent upon the 
success of negotiating a statute for the agency. This was achieved through a 
subtle and well-directed process which, at the outset, was set on three 
tracks: I) bilateral US-USSR consultations by diplomatic correspondence, 
2) bilateral, growing into multilateral discussions between the United States 
and Western-minded supplier countries, of which the ones with Canada and 
especially the United Kingdom added substantially to clarifying the func-
tion of the agency, and 3) discussions of the general idea and general 
principles at the annual UN General Assembly meetings. 
This three-track process resulted in «a shuttle effect in which the 
evolving draft passed back and forth from a small (though ever-increasing) 
group of States to organs in which practically the entire world community 
was represented>>.' The three tracks came together when the 12-power 
group was created. In this group all important factions in the General 
Assembly- East, West and South- were represented, and in addition it 
could base its work on comments from 36 additional countries. Once the 
most potent representatives of the different factions had agreed on a 
compromise draft, the hardest part of the job of creating a statute for the 
agency was done. At the end of the final Conference, one British official 
concluded that the biggest problem during the conference had been internal 
disagreements within the American delegation between representatives of 
the State Department and of the Atomic Energy Commission." 
Clearly, the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency was the 
result of prolonged discussions in various fora. The Statute was thus 
definitely a negotiated agreement. 
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Contents 
The institution that was established on the basis of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency Treaty differed significantly from the ideals put forward in 
Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace address. In the course of the negotiating 
process the focus had changed from perceiving the IAEA as basically a 
banking institution for materials into perceiving it primarily as a broker 
institution for information, expertise and materials. This was probably not 
so much due to developments within the negotiation process itself as to the 
fact that the new Eisenhower policy, of which the most significant element 
was the revision of the Atomic Energy Act, led to a large number of 
bilateral agreements being concluded, whereby the Americans provided 
other countries with information or materials. This development contrib-
uted to undermining the need for the agency to function as a bank. 11 The 
sponsoring powers thus came to see the main function of the agency - in 
the short run - as providing technical assistance, research, information and 
eventually materials. 
One important consequence of this change of objective was that the 
rationale of the safeguards system also changed. Eisenhower's speech had 
mentioned the need for internal safeguards, that is safeguards of materials 
stored by the agency. The negotiations came to focus almost exclusively on 
external safeguards, that is safeguards of nuclear activities within member 
countries that had received assistance from the agency .12 The Russians 
were the first to point out to the Americans that peaceful and military 
nuclear activities were related, and that consequently it was necessary to 
control the use of fissile materials." In July 1955 the British Prime Minister 
raised the same issue with Eisenhower, who apperantly had not been aware 
of the problem. Eden pointed to the fact that a country, once provided with 
a reactor, might have enough fissile material to be able to produce nuclear 
weapons before long. 14 From then on, the security problems related to 
fissile materials became one of the most important issues of the negotia-
tions. Thus, the main purpose of the experts meeting held during the 
Geneva Conference - the meeting that finally brought the Russians and the 
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Czechs into discussions in a multilateral forum- was to discuss the safe-
guarding of fissile materials. 
Disarmament measure? 
During the initial phases of the negotiations several efforts were made to 
link the establishment of the agency to various kinds of disarmament 
measures. Thus the Americans had in mind to make the IAEA an instru-
ment for the promotion of disarmament by refusing agency assistance to 
countries that had military nuclear programmes. During the Americans' 
discussions with the United Kingdom and Canada the idea was rejected by 
the Canadians, who insisted that disarmament issues should be handled 
separately. Although the British seem to have favoured the idea of linkage 
themselves, they still came to the conclusion that it was not practical to link 
the function of the IAEA to disarmament. It was not practical because it 
would not work. And it would not work because such a linkage would not 
be accepted by all countries, and especially not by the French. For the sake 
of reaching a universal agreement, disarmament objectives would not be 
made part of the statute .I' 
The second disarmament initiative came from the Soviet Union, which 
wanted to make the establishment of the Agency dependent upon an 
agreement on a test ban treaty. The Russians argued that the American 
proposal for the establishment of the IAEA did not meet its basic purpose, 
namely elimination of the threat of nuclear war. They maintained that 
helping countries to establish a nuclear power industry would not lead to a 
reduction of the stocks of nuclear materials that were needed for the 
manufacture of nuclear bombs, but would, on the contrary, lead to a world-
wide increase of fissile materials stocks. The Russians therefore proposed 
to prohibit the manufacture of nuclear weapons and to establish appropriate 
international control over this prohibition." This was a proposal that the 
Americans found totally unacceptable. 
Thirdly the British seem to have had at least an internal discussion with 
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the Americans and the Canadians about the possibility of making the USA, 
USSR and UK undertake formally, in connection with the establishment of 
IAEA, not to provide other countries with weapons or to help them to make 
it. The Canadians, however, rejected such a thought, saying that a coun-
try's weapons programme was not the Agency's business. They made it 
clear that Canada would reserve the right for herself to make nuclear 
weapons as well as to conclude bilateral agreements with countries having 
nuclear military programmes: <<If a country asked for her help with a 
military programme she would consider the request on its merits as with 
any other request for arms>>. 17 So the idea was rejected along with the rest 
of the proposals to link Atoms for Peace and disarmament. The following 
extract from an American note may be said to summarise perfectly the 
outcome of the discussions that had taken place on an eventual IAEA-
disarmament linkage: 
It is believed that the peacefzt! uses of atomic energy should not be 
withheld from the peoples of the world pending solution of difficult 
disarmament problerns. 18 
Definition of military activities? 
Throughout the negotiations there was a recurring debate on whether 
<<military activities» as opposed to <<peaceful activities» should be given a 
definition in the statute. <<Military» and <<peaceful>> are terms that are used 
repeatedly in the statute, to designate either the kind of projects that the 
Agency is to promote, or the kind of activity which Agency-sponsored 
projects should have no relation with. 
During the negotiating process there seems to have existed a kind of 
tacit majority view, which ruled that it was best to avoid defining the terms. 
At the final conference the French defied this consensus, and submitted an 
amendment suggesting that <<military applications of the atomic explosion 
and of the toxicity of radioactive products» were the only uses of nuclear 
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energy that should be regarded as military uses. What the French wanted 
was a confirmation that nuclear propulsion of ships should be regarded as a 
peaceful activity. Thus, when an understanding was reached- andre-
corded- that IAEA would be allowed to concern itself with propulsion of 
civilian ships, even though similar technology could be used for military 
transport, the French withdrew their amendment. An Indian amendment, 
elaborating on the French one, was likewise withdrawn." This outcome 
meant that the treaty did not address cases where there is an overlap 
between military and peaceful activities. 
The uncertainty created by this blurred borderline led the IAEA to be 
very careful about the kind of projects it involved itself with: projects 
receiving Agency assistance had to be unambiguously peaceful. And it 
meant that «military» was interpreted just as restrictively, as meaning an 
unambiguously war- or defense-related activity. Consequently, the main 
and perhaps the only abuse of Agency assistance that the Agency sought to 
prevent was the production of nuclear bombs.20 
Safeguarding bilateral agreements? 
During the so-called private discussions among the nuclear powers, bilat-
eral agreements were seen as a problem. The British argued that unless 
safeguards were applied to bilateral agreements as well as Agency assisted 
projects, the safeguards system would not work efficiently. If bilateral 
agreements were to be exempt from control, this would provide countries 
that needed help with the possibility to go ahead with nuclear research and 
development while at the same time avoiding control. For the control to be 
effective, it was, furthermore, necessary that all big supplier countries 
should agree on control of bilateral agreements. If such an understanding 
was established, it was probable that countries that did not want to be 
controlled, would still end up by accepting control in order to get assist-
ance.21 
Before the start of the 12-power'' discussions in March 1955, the 
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Americans raised the question of control of bilateral agreements with the 
Russians, suggesting informally that the major nuclear supplier countries 
might agree to insert safeguards against diversion of fissile materials to 
military purposes into their bilateral agreements with other countries. It was 
suggested that this could be agreed outside of the IAEA. The Russians did 
not want to commit themselves at this stage, but promised to come back to 
the question once the lAEA treaty was ratified. 23 
However, the question could not be avoided at the 12-power meeting. 
Already during the discussions at the lOth session of the UN General 
Assembly there had been numerous negative reactions, regarding the 
safeguards contained in the draft that was then discussed. The message to 
the nuclear powers was that few countries would willingly comply with the 
strict safeguards attached to receiving agency assistance if the same assist-
ance could be procured through bilateral agreements with no safeguards 
attached. At the 12-power meeting a new paragraph was in fact added to 
the safeguards provisions that made agency controls of bilateral agreements 
possible, by authorising the Agency to verify compliance also with bilateral 
and multilateral arrangements if the parties requested it." 
Discrimination 
One of the issues that caused most trouble in the final stages of the negotia-
tion process was the discriminatory aspects of the Statute. The statute was 
in fact fundamentally discriminatory in that it was not membership of the 
agency that determined a country's relationship with the Agency, but 
whether the country was at the supplying or receiving end of Agency 
assistance. 
The difference in status was expressed through the articles on safe-
guards; on composition of the Board of Governors; and on the distribution 
of power between the Board and the General Conference. The difference in 
status was enhanced due to the fact that the distinction between supplier 
and client countries corresponded to a cultural cleavage: the supplier 
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countries being industrialised countries, whether of a capitalist or commu-
nist brand, while the majority of the countries at the receiving end were 
developing countries. The fact that the negotiations took place in the mid 
1950s, a period when decolonisation was very much on the international 
political agenda, contributed further to accentuate the gap between western 
and third world countries. Accusations of discrimination played a particu-
larly important role in the discussions concerning the safeguards provi-
sions, the composition of the Board, and the powers of the Board and of the 
General Conference. 
Safeguards 
As already mentioned, Eisenhower's speech did not mention any external 
safeguards, since it was largely focused on the «pooh> concept of the 
Agency. In the first US outline of the Agency, presented to the Russians in 
March 1954, it was foreseen that the Agency would have the right to apply 
certain safeguards provisions, as well as to verify the status of materials 
allocated to a member. The safeguards issue was first brought into the 
negotiations by the Russians, who argued that the establishment of the 
IAEA would in reality help to spread nuclear capability, and not contain it, 
as was maintained by the Americans. The experts talks that took place 
during the Geneva Conference in August 1955 represented an American 
attempt to meet the Soviet contention that fissile materials resulting from 
Agency projects would increase the danger of war. The meeting was 
inconclusive, and it was generally agreed that the subject needed further 
study." 
The Russians were not alone in being concerned about the conse-
quences of spreading fissile materials. So were the British, whose Prime 
Minister had also raised the issue in general terms with Eisenhower before 
the opening of the Geneva Conference. In the view of the United Kingdom, 
plutonium and, to a certain extent, enriched uranium would, during the next 
decade, become available in weapons quantities to many countries in the 
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normal course of civil nuclear development. They therefore saw it as a 
main objective to «postpone for as long as possible the day when large and 
small, responsible and irresponsible countries alike, w[ ould] have the 
means to make at least a kiloton of untested weapons». They specifically 
hoped that a comprehensive disarmament plan would be in operation 
before that happened. The immediate concern was to make sure that the 
lAEA would accelerate the proliferation process as little as possible." 
During discussions with the Canadians and the Americans it transpired 
that the American minimum position was a system of auditing and inspec-
tion of Agency assistance, and provision in the statute for the extension of 
Agency control to assistance given under bilateral arrangements." At this 
stage it was clear that the Russians also thought the IAEA should have an 
inspectorial apparatus and a staff of inspectors." The British were content 
to go along on the basis of the American minimum position, but apparently 
saw such safeguards as a first step towards more comprehensive safeguards 
at a later stage. They were particularly concerned about the proliferation 
danger created by what they called «self-sufficient projects>>, that is 
projects that did not receive assistance from abroad. The ideal thing would 
have been to have such projects included in the safeguards regime, and 
they were themselves ready to open their civilian plants for inspection. But 
the Americans were not willing to have their plants inspected. And the 
British concluded that it was necessary to gain experience in applying 
controls of Agency assisted projects before proceeding to controls of self-
sufficient ones. The main thing was to have an inspection regime estab-
lished, which could then be made more comprehensive and more intrusive 
at a later stage. 29 
Thus, safeguards were among the subjects most fully treated by the 8-
power group. But still all provisions related only to controls on assistance 
supplied by the Agency. The 12-power group made several significant 
additions to and changes in the safeguards provisions, including adding the 
before-mentioned provision that allowed the Agency to control bilateral 
and multilateral agreements upon the request of the governments con-
cerned. In addition, two more provisions were added that specified how the 
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safeguards function would be financed. 
The final IAEA Statute outlined the following six safeguards proce-
dures: design review, records, reports, inspections, deposit of excess 
produced materials and finally sanctions." 
A question that arose very early in the process, and which continued to 
be debated until the end, was whether source materials (uranium and 
thorium) should be controlled in the same way as fissile materials (enriched 
uranium and plutonium). The sponsoring powers had their doubts. The 
Canadians worried that this kind of control would have negative commer-
cial consequences, and made it clear that they would only accept safe-
guards on the sale of uranium on the condition that all uranium supplying 
countries did the same. Thus universality as a basic principle for the statute 
was seen to be necessary also for commercial reasons. 
The British and the Americans feared that safeguarding uranium could 
establish a virtual agency monopoly of source materials, which would be 
detrimental to their interests. There is reason to believe that such fears 
evaporated as the negotiations went forward due to the increase during this 
period of the world's known resources of uranium. At the time of the 
ratification of the treaty, there was in fact a uranium surplus in the world 
market. In spite of their initial fears and hesitation, the sponsoring powers 
soon decided that source materials had to be part of the safeguards arrange-
ments. The American ambassador explained this standpoint in connection 
with the 12-power conference: 
When in addition to economic consideration, the objectives of a system 
of safeguards are taken into account, the importance of maintaining 
accountability records of source as well as fissionable materials is 
abundantly clear. The reason for including source materials (..) is the 
obvious one that fissionable materials may be derived from them'' 
The Indian government, whose representatives were the most forceful 
spokesmen for Third World interest, continuously fought this measure: at 
the UN General Assembly in 1955; at the 12-power meeting; and at the 
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final conference." The Indians wanted to exclude source materials from the 
reporting requirement and thus from auditing (Art. XIJ.A.3). At the final 
conference they submitted an amendment to that effect, but did not have 
enough support from other countries to have it passed. A clause was, 
however, added to the article to make it clear that the Agency could only 
require records of such source and fissile materials as were included in a 
safeguarded project or arrangement." This outcome was characteristic of 
the way the Western nuclear powers sought to accommodate India's 
criticism without giving in on important principles: substantial changes 
were rejected, but changes of formula that had a restrictive effect were seen 
as an acceptable compromise in order to reach a universal agreement. 
India's basic objection was that the control system was onerous and 
implied an intervention in the economic life of individual countries. The 
Indians insisted that the countries that were most dependent on Agency 
assistance would be most affected by such intervention. Instead of the 
proposed system, India suggested that the Agency should be satisfied with 
assurances from governments that fissile materials would not be diverted to 
military purposes, and she objected particularly strongly to the requirement 
that fissile by-products from Agency assisted projects, unless needed for 
immediate peaceful use, should be deposited with the Agency. India 
furthermore proposed to leave it to the Agency and the country concerned 
in each case to agree upon the nature of the controls between themselves. 
Before the final conference in September 1956, the American, British 
and Canadian governments agreed that there was no question of giving in 
on most of the issues raised by the Indians. The three Western powers 
agreed that: 
20 
any attempt to make applications of safeguards subject to agreement 
between the Agency and a member state was unacceptable, they would 
not allow source material to be exempt from inspection, no concession 
would be made which would diminish the Agency's rights and responsi-
bility to retainfzdl control over chemical processing, and over the 
deposit offissile materials recovered as a result of this processing." 
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The opposition to the Indian position was based on the analysis that if it 
were to prevail it would so reduce the effectiveness of the control system as 
to render it almost valueless." The problem was only that India was not 
alone in her views. She was supported by a number of developing coun-
tries, in particular Egypt, Ceylon and Indonesia, and also the French 
delegate went far in his support for the Indian amendments, saying that 
control of source material was not practical, but on the other hand he was 
careful not to promise to vote for the amendments." Although the commu-
nist countries did not publicly support the Indian position, the Western 
powers got the impression that the Soviet Union was behind India and 
would have liked the amendments to go through. The majority did not 
support the Indian amendments, but were the amendments to be put to 
vote, they could still be expected to get so strong support that the sponsor-
ing powers feared it would be embarrassing. They therefore concluded that 
it was necessaiy to change the wording of the safeguards article, thereby 
making it somewhat more restrictive, in order to make the Indians with-
draw their amendment. 
Thus the conditions under which the Agency could require the deposit 
of any access produced fissile material were clarified and made more 
restrictive (Art. XII.A.5). And a new sentence was added to Art.XII.A.6, 
authorising an inspected state to have the Agency's inspectors accompa-
nied as long as they were not delayed or in any way impeded in their 
function." The sponsoring powers considered these concessions worth 
making in return for securing a general support for the rest of Article XII, 
including Agency control of source materials and their by-products." 
The concept regarding safeguards were regarded as minimal by the 
United States. 
Financing and powers 
The sponsoring powers saw it as one of the main purposes of the Agency to 
acquire stocks of fissile material and to establish its own processing plants. 
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They were eager to make the Agency into a technical institution that could 
function competently and efficiently. These powers therefore thought it 
necessary to allow the Agency to raise funds. At the final conference, the 
British ambassador, Sir Pierson Dixon, pointed to the fact that the Agency 
would have a number of practical tasks to do which went far beyond those 
usually associated with international bodies. According to the ambassador, 
IAEA would not merely give technical assistance and help in training but 
would have the duty of providing materials and of building and operating 
laboratories and plants. He stressed that this unique and difficult task had to 
influence the nature of the Agency's direction. <<it would have to view its 
duties and select its staff, organise its facilities and arrange its finances as 
primarily a technical and operating body. It would certainly not be a 
debating society»." 
At the very outset of the negotiating process, the Americans had pre-
sented the Russians with an outline of the direction of the Agency. Accord-
ing to this outline the direction would consist of a board of governors and a 
general conference. The board of governors, representing governments, 
would be the highest executive authority of the Agency. They, furthennore, 
suggested that the number of members on the board should be limited and 
that its composition should partly be based on geographic position, partly 
on technical know-how. This fonnula was chosen in order to make sure 
that the Agency would get a competent board. However, both the East and 
the South saw this question in a different light. 
In fact the issue that the Soviet Union paid the most attention to during the 
final conference was the question of how to finance the Agency. The Eastern 
bloc feared that the Agency would embark on an e>.iravagant programme of 
construction, and present the major contributors to the Agency with the bill." 
They therefore sought to limit the financial commitments of the Agency as 
much as possible. To this effect they submitted the two amendments at the 
final conference, proposing a) that except for administrative expenses, Agency 
expenses (such as those related to procurement of materials, plants and 
equipment) should be financed only on a voluntary basis, and b) that the 
Agency should not be authorised to raise loans. 
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A majority of participating countries were critical of these proposals, 
and the Eastern bloc merely succeeded in changing the text, so that it was 
made quite clear that member countries would not be responsible for loans 
incurred by the Agency.41 The Soviet concern with financial questions may 
partly have been caused by proposals from developing countries, which 
seemed to indicate that a number of countries were hoping for direct 
financial as well as technical assistance from the Agency." One of the 
amendments submitted went so far as to imply that the Agency should have 
responsibilities with regard to financing the member countries' nuclear 
energy programmes. The text was changed so as to make it clear that the 
Agency was authorised to help - but merely help - raise funds to finance 
projects in member states. 
A measure which in a more positive way sought to reduce the expenses 
of the Agency was the introduction of an article authorising the Agency to 
cooperate with regional organisations over joint projects. This was sup-
posed to reduce the need for the Agency to set up its own installations, 
thereby limiting expenses." 
The developing countries were not satisfied with the American outline 
of the direction of the Agency. Throughout the negotiating process the 
original American idea of a relatively small and powerful board was 
gradually modified into a bigger organ losing power to the General Confer-
ence, where all member states had a seat. Thus at the 12-power meeting, 
the composition of the board was expanded from 16 to 23, and geographic 
distribution was emphasised at the expense of competence. Furthermore, 
the exercise of some of the functions of the board was made subject to 
rules approved by the General Conference, thus increasing the influence of 
the Conference over the board." 
During the lOth session of the UN General Assembly in 1955, India had 
been the most eloquent and competent critic of «discrimination>> on behalf 
of the Third World, and she became a member of the 12-power group." In 
the course of the overhaul of the statute that this group undertook, India 
insisted on a wider geographical representation in the board, and succeeded 
in changing the composition, so that five out of eight areas, into which the 
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world was divided, consisted primarily of developing countries from 
Africa, Asia and Latin-America. India seems to have been content with this 
achievement, and did not put forward additional amendments concerning 
the relevant article at the final conference. On the contrary, India's repre-
sentative, Dr. Homi Bhabha, said in the general debate that India was 
prepared to accept the draft as a fair compromise, although she still had 
misgivings about certain aspects of the article dealing with the board. 
Bhabha pointed out that the draft was the result of a delicate balancing of 
interests, and that consequently it would not be easy to alter any part of it 
without having to change the whole." 
In spite of the Indian moderation, the general debate showed that many 
countries wanted the General Conference to have greater powers for 
determining policy and a greater degree of control over the activities of the 
board. Many smaller nations disliked the perpetuation under the statute of a 
privileged group of powers, and they questioned the right of the countries 
producing source materials to have a special position on the board.47 But in 
spite of criticism, few suggestions for a better formula were made. The 
main demand was for separate representation for Africa and the Middle 
East. Eventually no changes were made in the composition of the board, 
but the powers of the General Conference vis-a-vis the board were slightly 
increased. 411 
National sovereignty versus control 
At the final conference the consequences that safeguards would have for 
national sovereignty became one of the most hotly debated issues. The 
Soviets and the Czechs had made it clear before the start of the conference 
that they had reservations on this point. At the conference, the Polish 
delegation put down an amendment, proposing that the activities ofthe 
Agency and the application of the Statute should be subordinated to respect 
for the «sovereign rights» of member states. The view of the sponsoring 
powers was the opposite, namely that the observation of sovereign rights 
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must be regarded as subordinate to the provisions of the statute. This 
principle was particularly strongly advocated by the British, who consid-
ered it an impossible situation if a given country were to be able to plead 
«sovereign rights» as an excuse for not fulfilling its commitments. A 
situation could arise where an Agency inspector was denied access to 
information or plant on the pretext that it was harmful to national inter-
ests.49 
At the conference the British ambassador, Sir Pierson Dixon, argued 
that in this century a new conception of sovereignty had come to replace 
the thinking of the 19th Century. This new conception of international 
responsibility and interdependence between nations had been born as a 
result of the emergence of new nations and the contraction of the world 
through the development of communications and economic links between 
countries. 50 A majority of the participating countries accepted the fact that 
the IAEA treaty would imply a partial surrender of sovereignty. The British 
view got a particularly strong support from certain nations, including the 
Scandinavians, Vietnam and the Philippines. A compromise formula 
suggested by the Poles and supported by the Indians was put to vote and 
defeated (34 against, 21 for, and 25 abstentions). In the end the sponsoring 
powers accepted a minor addition to the original text, which made it more 
acceptable to the Soviet bloc without weakening its effect." 
Conclusions 
Besides the wish to halt the nuclear arms race, the main driving force 
behind the world-wide acceptance of Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace plan 
seems to have been a strong belief in the value of nuclear industrialisation. 
The belief in the benefits of nuclear energy made recipient countries 
willing to accept the conditions attached to receiving help from the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency. These conditions were to a large extent 
stipulated by the supplier countries. The British papers suggest that the 
safeguards attached to receiving Agency assistance were strengthened 
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during the negotiations due to British and, indeed, Russian insistence on 
the danger of spreading fissile and source materials. 
Once the supplier countries had agreed among themselves on the need 
for safeguards and had reached some kind of understanding that it would 
be necessary to extend the safeguards provisions to bilateral agreements as 
well as Agency assisted projects, the receiving countries had in fact no 
choice but to accept auditing and inspections if they wanted assistance. On 
this background, it becomes clear that the Soviet insistence on control of 
fissile materials was of tremendous importance to the outcome of the 
negotiations. The Soviet Union may well have found it easy to accept the 
safeguards system of the IAEA: a system of auditing and inspections was 
very much in line with the proposals put forward by Andrej Gromyko 
during the discussions of the Majority Plan from I 946 to 1948 in the UN 
Disarmament Commission. Furthermore, the fact that only countries at the 
receiving end would be inspected, meant that the Soviet Union could avoid 
inspections if she wanted to. Still, the Soviet insistence on subordinating 
the provisions of the statute to the principle of sovereign rights seems to 
indicate that the Russians did have misgivings about relinquishing any 
power, however small, to an international organisation. If the Soviet 
proposal had been accepted, it might well have undermined the whole 
safeguards regime. A Soviet proposal that restricted the financial commit-
ments of member countries did go through, however, and the fact that, 
apart from administrative expenses, the member countries only contribute 
money on a voluntary basis to the Agency has probably been a major factor 
in curtailing the activities of the Agency. 
Indeed, the factors that most limit the powers of the Agency, seem to a 
large extent to have been decided upon early in the negotiations, that is 
during the discussions among the supplier countries. Thus it was decided 
that there would be no link between the IAEA and disarmament; and there 
would be no safeguards on national un-assisted nuclear projects. It was 
seen as a politically impossible task to make countries voluntarily renounce 
their right to make nuclear weapons. And in the Conference on the Statute 
a French insistence on the right to use nuclear power for ship propulsion, 
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and to receive Agency assistance for this purpose, was accepted. 
The Third-world countries' accusations of discrimination of poor 
countries had the effect of further weakening the safeguards regime. Thus 
it was decided that records would only be kept of source and fissile materi-
als that were in a safeguarded project or arrangement; that the inspected 
state would be allowed to have Agency's inspectors accompanied by 
national representatives; and that the conditions under which the Agency 
could require deposit of any surplus of fissile material would be restricted. 
These were restrictions of potentially great importance. 
The Third-world countries also managed to broaden the composition of 
the board and to transfer powers from the board to the General Conference. 
These alterations probably did not affect the ability of the board to function 
well. The Agency apparently became a competent and technical body, as 
the sponsoring powers had set out to make it, but limited in its scope of 
action, both with regard to financial commitments and safeguards. 
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